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COMMENTS
THE CLOSE CORPORATION-COMPARING THE SEPARATE
STATUTORY TREATMENTS OF FLORIDA, DELAWARE AND
MARYLAND WITH VIRGINIA'S VERSION OF THE MODEL ACT
In a trend beginning before the turn of the nineteenth century1 and ac-
,celerating during the period after the Second World War,2 state corporation
laws have evolved into enabling acts recognizing and catering to modem
business practices 3 The restrictions retained in these acts remain both to
protect the public and balance the relationships between interested parties
within the corporation. Despite these remaining restrictions, the philosophy
of the modem acts is to create a climate favorable for corporate activity.
Notwithstanding this evolutionary process, the statutes have only re-
cently 4 recognized that the corporate system that their provisions attempt
to define and regulate is not uniform, but rather two separate systems 5-the
public issue6 and the close corporation 7-struggling to live under one set
1 W. Frwrctwam, PxuvATr CORPORATONS § 1 (Perm. ed. Rev. Repl. 1963). For a discussion
of the restrictive nature of early corporation laws, see Louis F. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288
US. 517, 548-67 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2 The Model Business Corporation Act is representative of the activity during this
period. First published in 1950, it currently forms the basis of the corporation statutes
in the following jurisdictions (by order of adoption): Wisconsin (1951), Oregon (1953),
District of Columbia (1954), Texas (1955), Virginia (1956), North Dakota (1957),
Alaska (1957), Colorado (1958), Iowa (1957), Utah (1961), Wyoming (1961), Mis-
sissippi (1962), Nebraska (1963), South Dakota (1965), Washington (1965), Arkansas
(1965), New Mexico (1967), Georgia (1968), Montana (1968), Tennessee (1968),
Rhode Island (1968). In addition, it was followed to some degree in Maryland (1951),
North Carolina (1955), Alabama (1959), New York (1963), Massachusetts (1965),
Louisiana (1968), New Jersey (1968). ABA MODEL Bus. CoRP. Aar ANt. 2d § 1 (1971).
3 Latty, Why Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling," 50 CORNELL L.
REv. 599 (1965); Symposium-The New Look in Corporation Law, 23 LAw & CONM O,.
PROB. 175 (1958).
4 Since first statutory recognition of the special needs of the close corporation in New
York in 1948, many states have made some statutory concessions with three states
enacting separate acts. See, e.g, 1 F. O'NEAL, CLosE CoRPoRATioNs §§ 1.14 and 1.14a (1971)
[hereinafter cited as ONEAL].
5 Manne, Our Two Corporation Systens: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259
(1971).6 A. BERE & G. MEANs, TnE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTy 4-6 (1936).
For the purposes of this article, a public issue corporation is characterized by the sep-
aration of control from ownership brought about by the sale of its securities to the
"investing public" on the open market.
7 Tennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Economic Valid-
ity, 14 How. L.J. 241 (1968).
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of rules. The conflict exists because of the inherent differences in the two
corporate forms. As a general rule, those who form a close corporation
seek limited liability but do not share the public issue corporation's interest
in the assurance of a ready source of new capital. Thus, the dose corpora-
tion is characterized by restrictions on the free alienability of its shares and
carefully drawn agreements designed to govern the relationship between
the owners and the affairs of the corporation. Its genesis in a contractual
relationship between the parties coupled with the lack of a market for its
securities distinguishes the close corporation from the public issue corpora-
tion. What similarity there is between the two stems from the form imposed
on the close corporation by statutes created with the publicly held corpora-
tion in mind.
The argument for special statutory treatment of the close corporation is
not new.8 Indeed, that most modern corporation statutes today make some
concessions to the close corporation is the result of an intense lobbying effort
which began before World War I 9 and continues today.10 Proponents
have urged that because the close corporation is really only a partnership
seeking limited liability, conformity to the normal statutory formalities
designed for the publicly held corporation is a triumph of form over sub-
stance." Remaining debate on the subject boils down to a difference of
opinion on what price a business association should pay in exchange for
state granted life and limited liability. Those who champion special statu-
tory treatment argue that the decision to grant limited liability should turn
on economic and public policy issues, not form.' 2 Those few who urge
[A] close corporation is a business organization in normal corporate form with
shares not generally traded in security markets and few shareholders, all of
whom are generally known to one another, who wish to somehow participate
in the management of affairs in a partnership sense, but who have limited lia-
bility. Id. at 247.
8 See, e.g., Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE L.J. 875.
) Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MicH. L. REv. 273
(1929).
'OBradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation-The Need for More and
Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966); Israels, The Close Corporation and
the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948); Latty, The Close Corporation and the New
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 432 (1956); O'Neal, Close
Corporation Legislation: A Survey and an Evaluation, 1972 Durm L.J. 867; Oppenheim,
The Close Corporation in California-Necessity of Separate Treatment, 12 HAS7INGs LJ.
227 (1961); Symposium-The Close Corporation, 52 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 345 (1957); Note,
Statutory Assistance for Closely Held Corporations, 71 HAv. L. Rxv. 1498 (1958);
Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 700 (1958).
11 For a complete discussion of the distinctive needs of the close corporation, see
O'NAL §§ 1.01-1.16.
12Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations,
18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 473 (1953). For an excellent discussion of the public policy
CO MENTS
caution and due consideration before disregarding restrictions point out
that, with few restrictions other than an internal agreement between the
parties, it might be too easy for enterprises to begin and fail, transferring
the ultimate risk of failure to their creditors and the public.'3 For purposes
of this article, however, it is assumed that the modem statutory provisions
recognizing the special needs of the close corporations are justified.
This article will examine briefly the experience and provisions in the three
states that have attempted separate statutory treatment, Florida,' 4 Dela-
ware,'5 and Maryland,' 6 and compare what some think has been the best
effort with the current law in Virginia.
I. THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
The most persistent difficulty in drafting separate close corporation stat-
utes, determining a suitable definition, has been compounded by the fact
that scholars seldom agree on a single definition.-7 The drafter must find a
description that readily distinguishes the corporate form that the act will
govern from those that it will not. At the practical level, it is essential that
lawyers know and understand what is included in order to either bring their
clients within the coverage, or equally important, to avoid it.
Having weighed the alternatives, the drafters of the Florida act seized
upon one of the general characteristics of a close corporation-restrictions
on share transferability-to form their definition:
implications of statutory concessions to the close corporation, see Afterword, Note,
A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
700,,743 (1958).
1STennery, The Potential of the Close Corporation: A Question of Economic Va-
lidity, 14 How. L.J. 241 (1968):
From my exploration of the close corporation certain criticisms of this business
organization type can be suggested, particularly in the permissive maneuvera-
bility which can lead to the abuse of the basic corporate concepts-to a point
which we might term "legally-sanctioned fraud" in that the risk of doing busi-
ness can be transferred from the shareholder to the creditor. Id. at 258.
For a suggestion that separate legislation for the close corporation contain provisions
prohibiting the evils of thin capitalization, see Note, A Plea for. Separate Statutory
Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 700, 736-42 (1958).
14FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.70-.77 (Supp. 1972) (Herinafter cited as FLA. § . .].
15 DEL. CODE AN. tit. 8, §§ 341-56 (Supp. 1972) [Hereinafter cited as DEL. § . .
10MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§ 100-11 (Supp. 1971) [Hereinafter cited as Mt. § . .
17 In 1947 the New York Law Revision Commission abandoned the concept of 'a
separate close corporation statute because it could not create a satisfactory definition.
N.Y. STATELAw REVmsION Comz¢I'x RE~oRT 386 (1948). For an excellent survey of the
problems encountered in framing a definition, see, Legislation Note, Corporations-
Definition~of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L. REv. 1267 (1963). See OWNEAL § 1.02;
Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948). See also
note 7 supra.
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As used herein, close corporation means a corporation for profit whose
shares of stock are not generally traded in the markets maintained by
securities dealers or brokers.'
The "not generally traded" test has been used most frequently in acts
making special concessions to the close corporation. 19 Despite its wide use,
the definition represents one of the weaker parts of the Florida act, because
its use of indefinite language undermines the essential function of the defini-
tion. As pointed out in a criticism of the act, the "not generally traded"
language could apply to any corporation, whether or not intended to be
public issue, before a public offering of its stock is made.20 In addition, such
language must rely on court interpretation to delineate the permissible limits.
Thus, by focusing on the result, limited trading, instead of the cause, an
agreement among the parties limiting the transferability of shares, the statute
leaves the door open for confusion as to what the act regulates.21
In addition to these problems, the act is not clear as to whether its pro-
visions automatically apply to corporations that fit the definition, or whether
applicability must be elected. Equally unclear is whether once the status
is acquired, can it be lost by other than stockholder action?
Therefore, despite the recognized difficulty in arriving at any suitable
definition, the Florida "experiment" seems to have fallen short.
The Delaware statute adopts a functional rather than a descriptive definition
of the close corporation. To be governed by its provisions, the corporation
must include the following provisions in its certificate of incorporation:
(1) All of the corporation's issued stock of all classes, exclusive of
treasury shares, shall be held of record by not more than a specified
number of persons, not exceeding thirty; and
(2) All of the issued stock of all classes shall be subject to one or more
of the restrictions on transfer permitted by section 202 of this tide; and
(3) The corporation shall make no offering of any of its stock of any
class which would constitute a "public offering" within the meaning
of the United States Securities Act of 1933, as it may be amended from
time to time.22
1 8 FLA. S 608.70 (emphasis added).
19N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1965); N.Y. Bus. Cora. LAw § 620 (c) (McKinney
Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE § 12-16.22 (c) (Supp. 1971). For a look at the debate sur-
rounding the not generally traded test, compare Laty, The Close Corporation and the
New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, 439 (1956), with
Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 Dui L.J. 875, 947.2ODickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment That Failed, 21 U.
Mui~i L. REv. 842, 843 (1967).
21See generally Note, Corporations-Definition of the Close Corporation, 16 VAND. L.
REv. 1267, 1270 (1963).
22DvAi S 342.
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The Delaware definition avoids many of the problems encountered with
the Florida statute. It is clear which corporations are governed by the act,
because those affected must afradvely bring themselves within its pro-
visions by adopting the requisite elements in their certificates of incorpora-
tion. The act specifically avoids the "not generally traded" 2 test by pro-
viding that the securities will be subject to limitations on transferability, and
that no public offering can be made within the ascertainable standards set by
the Securities Act of 1933.24
While avoiding some of the problem areas, the numerical limitation in
the Delaware definition has been criticized as too arbitrary and not a true
limitation on the number of stockholders.25 Despite these arguments, it
appears that some limitation on the number of stockholders is a legitimate
prerequisite for close corporation status,26 based on the concept that the
separate provisions should not be available to what in effect would be public
issue corporations.27 Moreover, the functional definition explains that spe-
cial close corporation status can be lost by removing the necessary elements
from the charter. However, the definition is weak in that it permits the
status to be acquired or given up by a two-thirds vote of the stockholders,28
thus providing little comfort to a minority that opposes either move.
Maryland has adopted the most novel approach to the problem of defini-
tion. Any corporation may become subject to the act by the unanimous
23For an argument that Delaware has traded the unacceptable "not generally traded"
test for "an equally elusive and uncertain element in the form of a ban on a 'public
offering,"' see Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland
Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DuKE LJ. 525,532. For additional attack on the public
offering restriction, see Comment, Delaware's Close-Corporation Statute, 63 Nw. U.L.
REv. 230, 239-43 (1968).
24 Note, Corporations-Definitions of the Close Corporation, 16 VA-w. L. REv. 1267
(1963).25The Delaware Code actually authorizes at least 60 stockholders, since § 342(c)
permits jointly held stock to be treated as if held by one stockholder.
2 6 Professor Bradley makes a strong appeal for the number ten based on existing
rules governing Subchapter S qualification. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close
Corporation-The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J. 1145 (1966).
The number used [ten] is not altogether arbitrary, for we do know that busi-
nessmen and their counsel today are heavily influenced by the Subchapter S
provisions. Hence the number ten has relevance as no other number has. Id.
at 1190.
2 t Note, A Plea for Separate Statutory Treatment of the Close Corporation, 33
N.Y.UL. Rev. 700 (1958):
Without statutory recognition of the close corporation, public issue corporations
could avail themselves of provisions which for reasons of public policy should
not be applicable to such enterprises. Id. at 708.
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election of the stockholders to become a close corporation, and by the
insertion of a statement to that effect in the articles of incorporation.29 This
approach is sufficient, and in many ways preferable, to the Florida and Del-
aware examples, because of its insistence on unanimity for all major ques-
tions affecting the corporation."0 Not only does the requirement recognize
the partnership-like nature of the close corporation, but it also renders selec-
tion of close corporation status totally unacceptable to a public issue cor-
poration, thus accomplishing the purpose of a definition and avoiding the
difficulties inherent in most attempts to define the close corporation.
II. STATUTORY TREATMENT OF CONTROL MECHANISMS
A. Stockholder Agreements
The Florida statute permits the stockholders of a close corporation to
enter into written agreements, either by inclusion in the articles of incorpora-
tion or by-laws, or by simple side agreement, relating to any phase of the
affairs of the corporation, including but not limited to:
(a) Management of the business of the corporation.
(b) Declaration and payment of dividends as division of profits.
(c) Who shall be officers or directors, or both, of the corporation.
(d) Restrictions on the transfer of stock.
(e) Voting agreements, including the requirements of unanimous
voting of stockholders or directors.
(f) Employment of stockholders by the corporation.
(g) Arbitration of issues as to which the stockholders are unable
to break the deadlock.31
The sweeping language of this and similar sections in Delaware3 2 and Mary-
land33 is necessary to overcome whatever lingering effect earlier adverse
decisions34 might still have on these agreements. Specifically, the Delaware
provision provides:
29 MD. § 100.
30 Unanimity is required by section 100 to adopt or give up close corporation status;
by section 101 (a) to transfer the shares of the close corporation; by section 102 (a) to
issue additional shares (unless otherwise agreed by all in the stockholder agreement);
by section 104(b) to amend the stockholder agreement; and by section 110 to sell,
exchange, lease, etc., the corporation assets.
31 FLA. § 608.75.
3 2 DEL. § 354.
b3 MD. 104.
34 Abercrombie v. Davis, 35 Del. Ch. 599, 123 A.2d 893 (1956); Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 53 A.2d 441
(Sup. Ct. 1947). For a note on the enforceability of stockholder agreements in Vir-
COMMENTS
No written agreement among stockholders of a close corporation, nor
any provision of the certificate of incorporation or of the by-laws of
the corporation, which agreement or provision relates to- any phase
of the affairs of such corporation, including but not limited to the
management of its business or declaration and payment of dividends
or other division of profits or the election -of directors or officers or
the employment of stockholders by the corporation or the arbitration
of disputes, shall be invalid on the ground that it is an attempt by the
parties to the agreement or by the stockholders of the corporation to
treat the corporation as if it were a partnership....35
While the provisions in both statutes leave little doubt as to the validity of
stockholder agreements, by not including language authorizing the courts
to enforce their terms specifically, the two statutes have missed an oppor-
tunity to clarify the effectiveness of this important planning tool.36
Again, the Maryland act seems to provide a preferable scheme. It author-
izes stockholder agreements covering every facet and function of the cor-
poration;37 it includes authorization for the courts to enforce their terms
specifically;8 and its requirement for unanimity reduces the opportunity
for minority oppression inherent in the Florida and Delaware acts. For
example, the acts of the latter two states authorize stockholder agreements
among less than all the stockholders and with outsiders to limit the discre-
ginia, see Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the Model Business Corporation Act in Vir-
ginia, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1396, 1421 n. 132 (1967).
5 Del. § 354. See also Del. § 350, which provides:
A written agreement among the stockholders of a close corporation holding a
majority of the outstanding stock entitled to vote, whether solely among them-
selves or with a party not a stockholder, is not invalid, as between the parties to
the agreement, on the ground that it so relates to the conduct of the business
and affairs of the corporation as to restrict or interfere with the discretion or
powers of the board of directors....
36 For an argument that the new Delaware provisions eliminate the uncertainty in
this area see Note, The New Delaware Corporation Law, 5 HARv. J. LEIs. 413, 415
(1968).
37 The stockholder agreement may include but is not limited to:
(1) The management of the business and affairs of the corporation;
(2) Restrictions on the transfer of stock;
(3) The right of one or more stockholders to dissolution of the corporation
at will or upon the occurrence of a specified event or contingency;
(4) The exercise or division of voting power;
(5) The terms and conditions of the employment of any officer or employee
regardless of the length of the period of such employment;
(6) The persons who shall be directors and officers of the corporation;
(7) The payment of dividends or division of profits.
Md. § 104 (a).
8 MD. § 104(d). Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation 'Law, 27 MD. L. REv.
341 (1967). "This section is included solely for the purpose of insuring that the courts
entertain no doubt as to their broad power under the new statute." Id. at 357.
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don of the board of directors.3 9 Under these circumstances, a minority stock-
holder caught without a market for his shares may find "that the power to
manage the corporation not only is no longer in the hands of his fellow
incorporators but is held by a party who as a creditor has interests contrary
to those of the minority stockholder." 40 By contrast, the Maryland in-
sistence on unanimity in all stockholder agreements makes the most complete
accommodation of the partnership characteristics4' of the close corporation.
The purpose of this provision is to afford protection to the minority
stockholder against any change in the agreement which he has nego-
tiated and upon the basis of which he has invested.42
B. Management by the Stockholders
All three states43 have specific provisions allowing the stockholders to
manage the corporation without directors.44 Delaware, in an interesting con-
trast to its section limiting the board's discretion, requires that the decision
to do without a board of directors be incorporated into the charter by a
unanimous vote of all stockholders.45 However, the act shrinks from this
protection for minority holders, providing that once incorporated in the
charter, the management provision can be removed only by a majority
vote!40 The Maryland approach has also received criticism because the sec-
tion is not as permissive as it could have been, with the result that the stock-
holders must conform to the formalities imposed on a board of directors. 47
39 DEL. § 350. FLA. § 608.75(3).
40Note, The New Delaware Corporation Law, 5 HARV. J. LEmis. 413, 416 (1968).
For an argument that a "freeze-out" could be avoided by reading the term "stock-
holder" in section 354 of the Delaware act to mean all the stockholders, see Bradley,
A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes,
1968 DuitE L.J. 525, 537-38.
4 1 UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AC § 31 (1) (c).
42 Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REv. 341, 356 (1967).
43 FLA. § 608.72; DEs. § 351; MD. § 105.
44 Kessler, The Statutory Requirement of a Board of Directors: A Corporate Anacb-
ronisn, 27 U. Gm.L. Rav. 696 (1960).
-5 The Florida provision is essentially the same. "The articles of incorporation of a
close corporation may provide that the business of the corporation shall be managed
by the stockholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors...." FLA.
S 608.72.
4 6 DEL. § 351. For an opinion that the effect of this statute can create a classic "freeze-
out" of the minority holders, see Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation of the Delaware and
Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525,538.
4 7 MD. § 105. The criticism stems from the fact that the stockholders in abolishing
the board of directors do not abolish the corporate formalities surrounding the func-
tioning of a board. Under the provision of section 105 the formalities are transferred
to the shareholders.
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III. PROVISIONS FOR CONFLICT AND DISSOLUTION
A separate close corporation statute is not complete without provisions
for dealing with the conflict that can develop among the stockholders when
the glow of harmony wears off. Remedies for this problem are particularly
necessary in light of the absence of a ready market for the shares of a close
corporation. When deadlock develops, the minority stockholder will look
for a way out through either: (1) an equitable process to break deadlock,
(2) a sale of his shares at a fair price to other interested parties within the
corporation, or (3) dissolution.
The Florida act offers no alternative to dissolution unless arbitration is
:agreed to in the stockholders agreement.48 Empowering the court to dis-
solve the corporation on the petition of any stockholder if either the direc-
tors or stockholders is deadlocked, the statute does nothing to overcome the
existing case authority in Florida which refuses dissolution unless "deadlock
has progressed to the point where the corporate purpose is impossible
of attainment." 49 Therefore, it appears that Florida has not provided a
viable way out for the minority stockholder.
The Delaware act introduces a novel approach to breaking deadlock:
the provisional director.50 This procedure can be a valuable alternative to
dissolution in that it allows the business to continue without a sellout. The
provisional director is appointed by a chancery court upon the petition of
either one-half the directors or one-third the stockholders eligible to elect
directors, unless a petition by a lesser proportion is permitted by the articles
of incorporation.51 The court will appoint the director if it finds that the
business of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage
of the stockholders.
The supposed advantages of this remedy are thus predicated both
upon his power to cast a deciding vote to break deadlock on the direc-
tor level and upon his persuasiveness in pressing new ideas or alterna-
tives or by acting as mediator or conciliator. 52
48 FLA. § 608.77.
40 Dickson, The Florida Close Corporation Act: An Experiment That Failed, 21
U. MLmu L. REv. 842, 851 (1967).
o DEm. § 353.
1l If the corporation has different classes of stock, section 353 also allows petition
by two-thirds of the holders of any one class of stock. In addition, under section
352(b), a provisional director can be appointed as an alternative to a custodian if, in
the court's determination, it would be in the best interest of the corporation. The
standards governing the court's discretion seem to be different.
52Folk, Corporation Statutes: 1959-1966, 1966 DUKE Lj. 875, 953. Professor Folk
goes on to point out that the basic reason for deadlock is usually the incompatability
of the principals and the provision "may only postpone the day when more drastic
xemedies must be invoked." Id. at 953.
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The Delaware statute also empowers the court, upon the petition of any
stockholder, to appoint a custodian with power to dissolve the business.53
The act also allows dissolution upon the happening of a specified event,
pursuant to a stockholder agreement,5 4 thus completing a variety of alterna-
tives for the oppressed stockholder.
Section 79 A(a) of the Maryland Corporation Code, a section available
to the public issue corporation, provides that twenty-five percent of the
stockholders of any corporation may appeal to the court for dissolution if
the directors or stockholders are deadlocked. The electing close corporation
has the additional benefit of the more liberal language of section 109.
The standard under which a Section 109 dissolution is to be granted
is deliberately broad in order to allow the courts the widest possible
latitude in reaching fair and sensible results in a wide variety of cases.55
Under section 109, any stockholder may petition for and receive dissolution
if the court is convinced that the dissension is such that "the business and
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of
the stockholder generally." 51 If the stockholder agreement contains a clause
calling for the dissolution of the corporation upon the happening of an event,
or establishes some standard other than the code's, then it might not be neces-
sary to resort to a section 109 proceeding. 7 As an alternative to dissolution,
the Maryland Act establishes a right in the majority stockholders to pur-
chase the shares of the petitioner, thereby barring his right to dissolution. 8
This section assures a fair, court determined value for the seller's stock.
IV. SUMIMARY
Of the three statutes examined, the Florida attempt seems the least desir-
able. Its problem with a suitable definition and failure to provide real guid-
ance for the settlement of internal disputes renders this first attempt at sep-
arate treatment a poor model for future legislation.
The fact that Delaware's provisions for the public issue corporation,
contained in the separate subchapter, provide many of the same advantages
53 DEL. 352(a). There is some question whether the provisional director remedy is
really an alternative to the court appointed custodian. Since the custodian has the
power to wind up the affairs of the corporation, it seems logical that the director be
tried first, because his authority is to steer the corporation through a temporary
impasse. In reality, both these remedies best serve the public issue corporation and
make more sense in that context.
54 DEL. § 355(a); MD. § 104(a) (3).





to all corporations casts doubt on the necessity for stringent rules govern-
ing the attainment of close corporation status. In addition, Delaware's fail-
ure to require unanimity on certain key issues tends to make it appear less
desirable than the Maryland act. It remains to be seen if the Maryland
model can provide guidance as one reviews the statutory treatment of the
close corporation in Virginia. 9
V. THE CLosE CORPORATION AND VIRGIrNA's VERSION OF THE MODEL Act
The Virginia Corporation Code is an adaptation of the Model Business
Corporation Act [hereinafter referred to as the Model Act]. 6 Prior to 1969,
the Model Act made few concessions to the close corporation. In the 1969
revision, the drafters of the Model Act chose to amend the existing sections
rather than prepare a separate integrated chapter for the close corporation.
A. Definition
The Model Act does not concern itself with the definition problem be-
cause its sections designed for the close corporation are available to all
corporations as their needs require. Thus, it is argued that a public issue




Section 4(1) of the Model Act authorizes the corporation to "make and
alter by-laws, not inconsistent with its articles of incorporation or with
the laws of this state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs
of the corporation*"' This concession, along with section 35, which per-
mits the corporation to establish its own management scheme free of the
requirement for a board of directors,0 2 section 50, which grants authority
to the stockholders to establish the duties and responsibilities of corporate
officers, s section 54, which permits the articles to include "any desired
9For a recent evaluation of the Florida, Delaware and Maryland acts, see O'Neal,
Close Corporation Legislation: A Survey and an Evaluation, 1972 DUKE LJ. 867.00For a section by section analysis of the ABA-ALI MODEL BusiN-ss CoapoRxrioN
Acr, see the ABA MODEL Bus. CoaP. Acr ANN. 2d prepared by the Committee on Cor-
porate Laws (Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Laws of the American
Bar Association) published by the American Bar Foundation. See also note 2 supra.
61 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 4 (1). [hereinafter cited as MODEL Acr § .. ].
62 "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors
except as may be otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation." MODEL Acr § 35.
63 "All officers and agents of the corporation, as between themselves and the cor-
poration, shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management of the
corporation as may be provided in the by-laws . . . ." MODEL Aer § 50.
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provision for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation," I
and the key features of section 34, authorizing stockholders agreements
and ensuring their enforceability, 5 create a favorable statutory environ-
ment for the close corporation.66 However, one can argue that even this
liberalization of the law is not as productive as the total break from exist-
ing corporate norms made by the states that have enacted separate statutes.
For example, it is significant that the Model Act, in order to make itself
acceptable to a great many jurisdictions, has left its enabling language
vague, thus necessitating reliance on case law to add limits and definition
to its provisions. This is inherent to a degree in all legislation, but statutes
should strive to eliminate as much uncertainty as possible. Thus, the Mary-
land example, charting a totally new course for the close corporation and
removing all doubt as to the validity of certain key issues, seems a preferable
course of action.
Virginia's adaptation does not provide the same degree of flexibility to
close corporation planners as the original Model Act. A significant omis-
sion is found in Virginia's Code section 13.1-35. This section was originally
designed to make "agreements among shareholders regarding the voting
of their shares ... valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms with-
out limitation in time." 67 By failing to distinguish a voting trust from a
stockholders agreement, and by omitting the language authorizing enforce-
ment by the courts, the statute has failed to accomplish the purpose of the
Model Act provision. This omission should be corrected, not only for the
reason stated, but to acknowledge existing case authority in Virginia.6
2. Management by the Stockholders
Virginia's most glaring failure with respect to the close corporation is its
continued insistence on management by a board of directors. Section 35
of the Model Act directs that "the business and affairs of a corporation
should be managed by a board of directors except as may be otherwise
6 4 MODEL ACT § 54(h).
65 "Agreements among shareholders regarding the voting of their shares shall be valid
and enforceable in accordance with their terms. Such agreements shall not be subject
to the provisions of this section regarding voting trusts." MODEL ACT § 34.
66See ABA Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 35 (2d ed. 1971), for additional concessions
to the close corporation made by the Model Act.
87 ld. at 756-57.
68 Sternheimer v. Sternheimer, 208 Va. 89, 155 S.E.2d 41 (1967). Here the stock-
holders of a family corporation entered into an agreement covering the distribution
of the stock, the officers of the corporation, their duties, and compensation. The court,
in modifying and affirming the lower court decree, held that the contract was binding
on the parties and, without hesitation, enforced its provisions.
6 9 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-35 (1973).
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provided in the articles of incorporation." 70 According to the Committee
on Corporate Laws of the ABA, the purpose of the 1969 amendment adding
the italicized language was to:
permit close corporations to do under the law what they have been
commonly doing in practice. The generality of the provision permits
almost complete flexibility in patterns of management that can be
tailored to specific needs . ... This amendment will permit useful
flexibility not only for family owned corporations but also for cor-
porate joint ventures.71
Virginia's adaptation of section 35 does not permit the sought after flexi-
bility. Section 13.1-35 grants the stockholders veto power,72 if reserved in
the articles of incorporation, but continues to tie the corporation to formal-
ities, even though liberalized, 73 designed essentially for the public issue
corporation. This omission casts doubt not only on the effectiveness of
section 13.1-3(1), 13.1-24, 13.1-45, and 13.1-49(g) 74 in close corporation
planning, but also on the validity of stockholder agreements to emasculate
the board and assume a partnership form. This continued insistence on an
outmoded form is even more surprising in light of case authority giving
effect to stockholder agreements which extensively control corporate
activity. 75
3. Provisions for Conflict and Dissolution
Both the Model Act and its Virginia adaptation contain liberal provisions
for the dissolution of a corporation. 6 Because the provisions are designed
for both the public issue and the close corporation, they more closely reflect
the needs of the former than the latter, such that stockholders can plan
for dissolution on the happening of a specified event solely through the
questionable procedure of drawing in advance a section 13.1-80 voluntary
dissolution agreement.77 In addition, an equity court might be hard pressed
0 MODEL Acr § 35 (emphasis added).
71 ABA MODEL Bus. CoRP. Acr ANN. at 755 (2 ed. 1971).
72 "The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors
subject to any requirement of stockholder action made by this Act or the articles
of incorporation." VA. CODE AN. § 13.1-35 (1973).
73 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-36 (1973) (authorizing a single director for certain
corporations), and VA. CODE Am. § 13.1-41.1 (1973) (authorizing director action with-
our a meeting).
74 For the corresponding Model Act provisions, see notes 63-66 supra.
75 See note 70 supra.
76 MODEL Acr § 82-104; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-79 through 13.1-101 (1973).
77 "A corporation may be voluntarily dissolved by the written consent of all of its
stockholders." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-80 (1973). The agreement must be drawn in
advance because it might be impossible to achieve consent among the stockholders once
dissension exists.
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to grant dissolution to a stockholder seeking dissolution based on the viola-
tion of the original agreement because the court's discretion is limited by
a standard designed for public issue corporations."8
Short of dissolution, Virginia section 13.1-94 grants an equity court the
authority to appoint a custodian based on the Delaware model.79 How-
ever, continuation of the business under a custodian might only postpone the
inevitable if a strong difference of opinion develops among the stockholders.
Here again, it appears that the needs of the "partners" in a close corpora-
tion do not quite fit under the provisions of a statute designed for a public
issue corporation.
CONCLUSION
From this brief survey, it is evident that there is much room for improve-
ment in the statutory treatment of the close corporation in Virginia. It
seems equally clear that the most preferable alternative is to recognize the
two separate corporate systems in separate legislation. It is a basic fact that
in most modem public issue corporations, ownership and control are sep-
arated. It is equally true that in most close corporations, ownership and
control are exercised by the same people or according to their contractual
wishes. The ramifications, remedies, public policy arguments and needs that
are generated by the separation of ownership from control are completely
different from those that flow from the integration of these two functions.
These elementary facts are the core of the argument for separate legislative
treatment.
If this alternative is chosen, Virginia and other states can learn much
from the Maryland example. Maryland's consistent requirement for stock-
holder unanimity on issues that affect the basic nature of the corporation,
its broad grant of authority to the stockholders to construct an individualized
management form, and its procedures for internal dissension provide a viable
model for future close corporation legislation.
F. W. P., III
78 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-94 (1973) authorizes an equity court to order dissolution if
it finds, in the case of petition by a stockholder, that the directors are deadlocked and
the stockholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable injury to the
corporation is being suffered; or that the acts of the directors are illegal, oppressive
or fraudulent; or that if the stockholders are deadlocked, irreparable harm is thereby
threatened; or that the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. In addition
to these standards, the 1968 amendment to the section may have further limited the
court's discretion by the added language that "where the court also finds that it would
be in the best interests of both the creditors and the stockholders of the corporation,
,. ." Such provisions are designed to make it difficult for a public issue corporation
to be dissolved for a frivolous reason but give little relief to a close corporation stock-
holder seeking dissolution for violation of a stockholder agreement.
7
-
9 See note 50 with accompanying text, supra.
